English
Diverse regulatory failures such as the allegedly lax monitoring of British Petroleum?s Deep Water Horizon, and far-reaching financial deregulation are often unanimously attributed to regulatory capture. That is, regulatory agencies are said to strategically create regulatory norms that only benefit their constituency rather than the public interest. And that they do this in response to regulatory lobbying. Why does this happen in certain agencies and not, or to a lesser extent, in others? By building on my earlier work and drawing on theories of interest mobilization and behavioral organization theory, my proposed project?s main aim is twofold. First, to empirically investigate the conditions of regulatory capture. And, second, to account for a neglected behavioral explanation of regulatory decisions. This alternative explanation predicts that regulatory decisions are the result of routine behavior and decision heuristics rather than the strategic self-interest that is central to almost every account of regulatory capture. My project objectives are fourfold: Objective 1: Determining regulatory preferences and the construction of a database of EU regulatory issues. Objective 2: Developing and testing a two-stage model of regulatory lobbying. Objective 3: Developing and testing a model of regulatory decision-making that includes strategic and non-rational decision-making. Objective 4: Developing and testing a model that explains the circumstances under which regulatory capture is likely to occur My project results in 1)a testable and general theory of regulatory decision-making, 2) detailed knowledge of the circumstances under which regulatory capture is likely to occur, 3) an open access database with primary data that links regulatory output, regulatory lobbying and agency decision-making and 4) a regulatory instrument with which regulators can assess the likelihood of capture.
